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ANDREAS ABEGG* 
I. IRRITATIONS IN LAW: CO-OPERATION BETWEEN 
GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION AND PRIVATE 
PERSONS IN NETWORK FORM 
I.1 The Case: Swiss Federal Court Decision 109 Ib 146 (1983) 
Today‘s increasingly co-operative relations between the state and private persons have 
brought numerous new problems to the law. It may even be held that the new types of 
‗co-operationism‘ between the state and private persons has plunged the law into deep 
crisis. This is because by freeing the administration from the constraints which are 
binding by statute, on the one hand, and transferring to private entities competences 
hitherto incumbent on government for the upholding of public interests, on the other, the 
basic pillars of democracy under rule of law are called into question. This can be 
illustrated very clearly by the example of decision 109 Ib 146 (1983) of the Swiss Federal 
Court on the Agreement on the Swiss banks‘ code of conduct with regard to the exercise 
of due diligence (abbreviated as ‗CDB‘). But this is not all: decision 109 Ib 146 also 
indicates that the problem of co-operationism may be closely connected with another [p. 
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256] new sort of phenomenon which is increasingly irritating the law: the organisational 
form of the network.
1
 
Specifically, the object of the Federal Court decision 109 Ib 146 (1983) was that 
the Swiss National Bank, a public institution of the Confederation, had, without a specific 
legislative mandate, renewed, in the form of bilateral agreements, the ‗Agreement on the 
Swiss banks‘ code of conduct with regard to the exercise of due diligence‘ with the 
overwhelming majority of Swiss banks.
2
 The renewed CDB of 1983 contained tighter 
rules on the disclosure of the identity of third parties on whose behalf assets had been 
invested. In contrast with earlier agreements of 1977, in this version of the CDB, the 
range of those not required to disclose the origin of monies to be invested was reduced. 
The Association of Trustees (Treuhänder-Verband), affected by this, asked to be 
exempted from the identity disclosure, as the lawyers and the Chamber of Trustees and 
Auditors (Treuhand- und Revisionskammer) had been.
3
 This was rejected by the National 
Bank in a letter to the petitioner. The Association of Trustees challenged this letter as an 
administrative decision in an administrative-court complaint to the Federal Court.
4
 
Before briefly summarising the Federal Court‘s deliberations, let us mention the 
pre-history of the CDB. In the mid ‘70s, using guarantees and sureties from a major 
Swiss bank, and in infringement of Swiss capital influx regulations, foreign investors had 
transferred money amounting to over CHF 2 billion to the Texon finance company in 
Vaduz (Liechtenstein), which was operative in Switzerland.
5
 The money invested was 
                                                 
1
 According to G Teubner, ‗Coincidentia Oppositorum: Hybrid Networks beyond Contract and 
Organisation‘ (ch 1), in this volume, a network, or combination of contracts, exists where, first, the bilateral 
contracts reciprocally refer to each other in the performance programme or in contractual practice; 
secondly, there is reference in the content to the overall project; and thirdly, there is legally relevant close 
co-operation between the parties to the combination (‗economic unit‘). 
2
 For the first time in the Agreement of 9 December 1977. The Swiss Federal Court decision 109 Ib 146 
was about the CDB of 1 July 1982. See the comparison of the first two versions of the CDB in P Nobel, 
‗Die neuen Standesregeln zur Sorgfaltspflicht der Banken‘ (1987) 39 Wirtschaft und Recht 149–66, with 
further references. 
3
 In particular, the Treuhänder-Verband might have wanted to counter damage to its image. However, the 
overwhelming majority of the banks actually participated in the CDB, so that the limited choice of bank did 
amount to an economic disadvantage for the members of the Treuhänder-Verband. 
4
 Federal Court decision 109 Ib 146 at 146 et seq. 
5
 For a summary of the events, see the reports in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ) 26 April 1977, p 15 and 
28 April 1977, p 13; in detail, from the banks‘ perspective, see J Jung, From Schweizerische Kreditanstalt 
to Credit Suisse Corp—The History of a Bank (Zürich, NZZ Verlag, 2000) 245 et seq, especially at 257. 
linked, above all, with tax evasion and money laundering, whereupon, among other 
things, foreign policy pressed the Swiss legislature to take corrective action.
6
 The 
resulting scandal—which initially [p. 257] affected the political world, but affected the 
business world almost immediately afterwards—had so much impact on the image of the 
Swiss banking sector that, as a direct consequence, the self-restraint of the ‗know-your-
customer‘ rule was adopted, in the form of the CDB agreement in the sector. The first 
CDB in 1977 specifically required, in Article 4, the determination of the origins of 
funds.
7
 Once the Texon scandal had died down, the banks agreed, in 1982, upon a new 
version of the CDB with the National Bank, which, while still directed against the 
furtherance of economic criminality by the banking industry,
8
 largely formalised the 
duties of clarification.
9
 
How, then, did the Federal Court, in decision 109 Ib 146, respond to CDB 1982 as 
an agreement between the National Bank and the banks, and in particular to the third-
party interests of the Treuhänder-Verband? The Federal Court did not hear the complaint, 
on the grounds that the CDB was a private contract, and, accordingly, the National 
                                                                                                                                                 
See Federal Court decision 105 Ib 348. Specifically, there was infringement of capital-movement 
regulations aimed at reducing the inflow of foreign money, particularly through levies. 
6
 At first, mainly Italy was affected by this capital drain of approximately CHFr 2 billion: see NZZ 20 April 
1977, p 15, 26 April 1977, p 15, 28 April 1977, p 13 and 6 May 1977, p 17; see also Federal Court decision 
105 Ib 348, especially, facts A., E. 10d) and 11; see G Müller, ‗Zur Rechtsnatur der Vereinbarung über die 
Sorgfaltspflichten der Banken bei der Entgegennahme von Geldern und über die Handhabung des 
Bankgeheimnisses‘ (1984) SJZ 349 at 350, Nobel, ‗Die neuen Standesregeln zur Sorgfaltspflicht der 
Banken‘ (n 2 above) 149 et seq; P Nobel, Schweizerisches Finanzmarktrecht (Bern, Stämpfli, 2004) §6 N 
6, fn 6. 
7
 The main purpose of the first CDB from 1977 has remained almost unchanged to this day: ‗All due 
diligence which can be reasonably expected under the circumstances must be exercised in establishing the 
identity of the beneficial owner. If there is any doubt as to whether the contracting partner is himself the 
beneficial owner, the bank shall require by means of Form A a written declaration setting forth the identity 
of the beneficial owner‘. Art 3 Abs 1 CDB 2003. For an overview of the CDB‘s origins, see U Zulauf, 
‗Gläubigerschutz und Vertrauensschutz: Zur Sorgfaltspflicht der Bank im öffentlichen Recht der Schweiz‘ 
(1994) 113 ZSR 359 at 434 et seq, D Zuberbühler, ‗Das Verhältnis zwischen der Bankenaufsicht, 
insbesondere der Überwachung der einwandfreien Geschäftstätigkeit, und der neuen 
Sorgfaltspflichtvereinbarung der Banken‘ (1987) 39 Wirtschaft und Recht 167, and Nobel, ‗Die neuen 
Standesregeln zur Sorgfaltspflicht der Banken‘ (n 2 above). As to new developments, see W de Capitani, 
‗Die Aufsichtskommission VSB und das zehnte Gebot‘ in HCvd Crone, P Forstmoser, RH Weber and R 
Zäch (ed), Aktuelle Fragen des Bank- und Finanzmarktrechts: Festschrift für Dieter Zobl zum 60. 
Geburtstag (Zürich, Schulthess, 2004). 
8
 Explicitly stated in the preamble to CDB 1982. 
9
 Articles 2–5 CDB 1982; see the comparison with CDB 1977 in Nobel, ‗Die neuen Standesregeln zur 
Sorgfaltspflicht der Banken‘ (n 2 above). 
Bank‘s note to the Treuhänder-Verband was not an administrative (public law) decision 
that could be challenged. This is because the CDB was primarily aimed at taking over 
provisions from foreign penal law, in order to avert conflicts with foreign legal systems. 
However, since the actions targeted in the CDB—such as active assistance with tax 
offences or currency offences abroad—were not punishable in Swiss law, the interests 
theory did not lead to an allocation to public law.
10
 And in the subordination theory, it 
would seem that, while the National Bank had been ‗encouraged‘ to act by the Swiss 
Federal Council (ie, the Swiss Government), it was not exercising any specific legislative 
mandate, and the individual banks had accordingly been at liberty either to adhere to the 
Agreement or not. The fact that a similar arrangement could also have been created by 
statute [p. 258] was not relevant in the eyes of the court. Accordingly, the CDB was to be 
defined as a private contract.
11
 At most, a complaint to a supervisory authority might be 
brought against the National Bank, which 
in its private-law activities analogously [sic] has to comply with the constitutional basic 
rights. In particular, even as a subject of private law it must not confer rights or impose 
duties legally unequally or arbitrarily.
12
 
Legal scholars are to date in disagreement as to the law‘s needful adaptations to 
the emerging trends to co-operationism and privatisation (or ‗essentialisation‘ 
(Verwesentlichung) of the state‘s functions13): on the one hand, there are calls for the 
extension of public law,
14
 though this certainly brings the danger of stifling the new-style 
co-operationist forms under restrictive regulations.
15
 On the other, there are suggestions 
that the law should follow social changes by shifting corresponding situations from 
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 109 Ib 146 (1983) 149 et seq, especially E. 2. 
11
 109 Ib 146 (1983) 152 et seq, E. 3. 
12
 109 Ib 146 (1983) 155, E. 4. 
13
 Thus, for example, G Müller, ‗Wege zu einem schlanken Staat: Überprüfung der Aufgaben stete Pflicht 
der Staatsleitung‘, NZZ, 16 March 2005; for a wider perspective see also B Dörr, P Donges, M Künzler, A 
Ledergerber, M Puppis, E Schade and M Vogel, Selbstregulierung und Selbstorganisation, 
‗Unveröffentlichter Schlussbericht zuhanden des Bundesamtes für Kommunikation‘, available at: 
http://www.mediapolicy.unizh.ch/forschung/selbstregulierung_report.pdf (last visited 8 December 2006). 
14
 Thus, for example, Richli, who criticises the Federal Court decision 109 Ib 146 for calling the CDB a 
private contract, but praises it for the observation that the National Bank does come under the fundamental 
rights: P Richli, ‗Die verwaltungsrechtliche Rechtsprechung des BGer 1983: Bankengesetz‘ (1985) 81 
ZBJV 428–30; see, recently, also Y Hangartner, ‗Bemerkungen zu BGE 129 III 35‘ (2003) 6 Aktuelle 
Juristische Praxis (AJP) 690–93. 
15
 In 129 III 35 (2003), the Federal Court responded logically to the essentialisation of state tasks being 
pursued politically; see M Amstutz, A Abegg and V Karavas, Soziales Vertragsrecht (Basel, 2006). 
public to private law and especially the law of contract,
16
 which would, however, thus be 
confronted with standards hitherto located in public law, and thus be irritated in the 
extreme, to the point of calling its own premises into question.
17
 
This extremely demanding adaptation of law to increasing governmental co-
operationism is however—as is evident from decision 109 Ib 146—at the same time, 
exposed to further irritations from equally far-reaching and novel changes in the 
environment: ie, the shifts from [p. 259] market-related organisational structures on the 
one hand, and hierarchical ones on the other (reflected in law as contract and 
corporations) to network-type structures, for which the law is not prepared with 
categories of its own.
18
 
These two new-style contextual conditions of co-operationism and network 
structures do not always appear as isolated contextual constraints on law, but may be so 
interlinked as to heighten the demands on the law‘s adaptability. Hitherto, such 
phenomena have been studied under the heading of ‗self-regulation under governmental 
direction‘,19 though this places insufficient emphasis on, first, the active role of the 
economy and secondly, the new-style network organisation.
20
 It seems manifest to me 
that co-operationism between the state and private persons happening purely in individual 
contracts in the foreground—yet nonetheless in the background in network structures 
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 Thus, for example, A Marti, ‗Aufgabenteilung zwischen Staat und Privaten auf dem Gebiet der 
Rechtsetzung—Ende des staatlichen Rechtsetzungsmonopols?‘ (2002) 10 Aktuelle Juristische Praxis (AJP) 
1154 at 1158. 
17
 For instance, in Federal Court decision 129 III 35 (2003) constitutional tasks for law of contract emerge 
openly: Amstutz, Abegg and Karavas, Soziales Vertragsrecht (n 15 above). And, in the theory of mutually 
absorbing systems, private law functionalized by public interests henceforth appears—to put it rather 
bluntly—as now just an appendage to public law. 
18
 For much more on this, see G Teubner, Netzwerk als Vertragsverbund: Virtuelle Unternehmen, 
Franchising, Just-in-time in sozialwissenschaftlicher und juristischer Sicht (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2004). 
19
 Among many, Marti, ‗Aufgabenteilung zwischen Staat und Privaten auf dem Gebiet der Rechtsetzung‘ (n 
16 above), with further references; on the history of self-regulation in Switzerland, see A Mach, G 
Schnyder, T David and M Lüpold, ‗Transformations de l‘autoregulation et (re)regulation publique en 
matiere de gouvernement d‘entreprise en Suisse (1980–2002)‘ (2006) 12 Revue suisse de science politique 
1–32; Y Sancey, Un capitalisme de Gentlemen. Emergence et consolidation de l’autorégulation bancaire 
en Suisse et en Angelterre (1914–1960) (Diss) (Lausanne, unpublished thesis University of Lausanne 
2004); H Bänzinger, Die Entwicklung der Bankenaufsicht in der Schweiz seit dem 19. Jahrhundert (Bern, 
Haupt, 1986). 
20
 Typical of this approach is U di Fabio, ‗Verwaltung und Verwaltungsrecht zwischen gesellschaftlicher 
Selbstregulierung und staatlicher Steuerung‘ in Kontrolle der auswärtigen Gewalt: Veröffentlichungen der 
Vereinigung der deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer Heft 56 (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1997). 
which ultimately bring about more than the sum of the individual contracts—possesses 
enormously explosive implications for current legal concepts such as the rule of law 
binding of administrations, on the one hand, or the privity of contracts, on the other. 
I.2 Exploratory Movements in the Co-evolution of Politics, Economy and 
Law 
Once the Federal Court had assigned the CDB to private law—while at the same time 
pointing out the National Bank‘s ‗analogous‘ binding by fundamental rights—and after 
the ensuing criticisms by legal scholars had highlighted the inability of the Federal 
Court‘s chosen option to provide stability and had called for the CDB to be brought back 
under [p. 260] public law,
21
 economic and political actors responded. For the new version 
of the CDB in 1987, the National Bank withdrew from the Agreement, thus responding to 
the critics who had complained of the lack of a statutory basis for the National Bank‘s 
involvement in the CDB.
22
 This change was intended to avert the danger that the CDB 
might, as some critics were demanding, still be brought under public law or—even more 
undesirably—lead to far-reaching legislation.23 The place of the National Bank was taken 
by the Swiss Federal Banking Commission (Federal Banking Commission), which 
possessed the appropriate statutory powers as a supervisory authority to act in relation to 
the CDB, and, indeed, had even felt called upon to abrogate parts of the CDB in 1991.
24
 
Moreover, unlike the National Bank, the Federal Banking Commission no longer 
appeared as a direct contracting party with the banks, something similarly intended to 
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 See, especially, Müller, ‗Zur Rechtsnatur der Vereinbarung über die Sorgfaltspflichten der Banken bei 
der Entgegennahme von Geldern und über die Handhabung des Bankgeheimnisses‘ (n 6 above); R Rhinow, 
‗Verfügung, Verwaltungsvertrag und privatrechtlicher Vertrag‘ in Juristische Fakultät der Universität Basel 
(ed), Privatrecht—Öffentliches Recht—Strafrecht: Grenzen und Grenzüberschreitungen; Festgabe zum 
Schweizerischen Juristentag (1985); R Rhinow, ‗Verwaltungsrechtlicher oder privatrechtlicher Vertrag: 
Fiskalwirkung der Grundrechte‘ (1985) 4 Recht 57–64. 
22
 Initially, the National Bank became involved because the Texon scandal not only affected the stock 
quotation of the Kreditanstalt, the bank involved in the scandal, but also resulted in a sharp decline of the 
Swiss Franc: NZZ 27 April 1977, p 17 and 5 May 1977, p 29. 
23
 Thus also the interpretation by Zuberbühler, ‗Das Verhältnis zwischen der Bankenaufsicht, insbesondere 
der Überwachung der einwandfreien Geschäftstätigkeit, und der neuen Sorgfaltspflichtvereinbarung der 
Banken‘ (n 7 above) 167. 
24
 Specifically, this concerned the ban on Form B by the EBK circular of 25 April/1 July 1991: 
Jahresbericht der EBK zum Jahr 1991 at 17 et seq Form B allowed trustees to declare that the party 
actually entitled was known, but was not being disclosed. 
avert further politicisation. Correspondingly, the network came to meet the demands from 
legal scholars to equip the CDB with comprehensive framework legislation on the one 
hand, and replace it with more or less traditional professional etiquette on the other. The 
position at the centre of the network, concluding the individual agreements with the 
banks, was now taken over by the banks‘ private trade association, the Swiss Bankers‘ 
Association, while the Federal Banking Commission was intended to act as supervisory 
authority.
25
 
However, these changes could not prevent further pressure on Switzerland as a 
banking centre and on the CDB.
26
 Attacks on Swiss banks [p. 261] ensued during the US 
‗war on drugs‘, and this contributed to the introduction of the penal prohibition of money 
laundering.
27
 This penal provision stated, by way of a framework Act, that the 
identification duty was to be carried out with the care that was appropriate to the 
circumstances, something—so ran the message from the Swiss Federal Council28—that 
was fleshed out in the CDB. Numerous legal scholars immediately accused this penal 
framework law of infringing the principle of clarity and definiteness.
29
 Renewed pressure 
on banking regulation, leading inter alia to further tightening of the provisions against 
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 As also in CDB 2008 of 7 April 2008, available at: http://www.swissbanking.org/20080410-vsb-cwe.pdf 
(last visited 6 October 2008). The EBK issues instructions as to which institutions a declaration on actual 
entitlement must be secured from (Art 3, N 34.4), receives notices of infringements from the audit office 
and the CDB supervisory commission (Arts 10 and 12(9)) and authorises amendments to the CDB (Art 
14(3)). 
26
 From an evolutionary-theory viewpoint, these further developments can be brought together under the 
concept of punctuated equilibrium: variations do not appear in a system uniformly and gradually, but are 
generated above all by unexpected or even scandalous events that cause the possibility of actual 
evolutionary jumps (in the sense of contingency), thus differing from either arbitrariness or 
predetermination. See N Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt aM, Suhrkamp, 1993) 243; MT 
Fögen, ‗Rechtsgeschichte—Geschichte der Evolution eines sozialen Systems‘ (2002) 1 RG 
Rechtsgeschichte 14–19; M Amstutz, ‗Die Verfassung von Vertragsverbindungen‘ in M Amstutz (ed), Die 
vernetzte Wirtschaft (Zürich, Schulthess, 2004) 55 et seq; Fögen has coined the appropriate expression 
‗sensational stories‘ for the jumps, and calls Gould‘s punctuated equilibrium an ‗attractive third way the 
social sciences might also take‘: MT Fögen, Römische Rechtsgeschichten—über Ursprung und Evolution 
eines sozialen Systems (Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2002) 16 and 18 et seq; Luhmann points out 
that, in modern society, the punctuational aspect is radicalised by the mass media, which preferentially 
report divergent variations: N Luhmann, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt aM, Suhrkamp, 
1997) 474. 
27
 Art 305ter StGB, introduced by No I of the BG of 23 March 1990, in force since 1 August 1990 (official 
collection of Swiss law 1990 1077 1078; BBl 1989 II 1061). 
28
 BBl 1989 I 1089 f. 
29
 Among many: W de Capitani, ‗Zum Identifikationsverfahren bei Kontoeröffnungen aus dem Ausland‘ 
(1993) 89 SJZ 21 at 21 et seq, fn 2, with further references. 
money laundering, came after 1992, first in connection with the Italian ‗Mani pulite‘ 
campaign following bribery scandals, and more recently under the heading of terrorism.
30
 
How did the Federal Court respond to these developments, ie, to the criticisms of 
decision 109 Ib 146 by the legal scholars and to the moves for modifications from politics 
and business? Two years after decision 109 Ib 146, the Federal Court again had a chance 
to speak on the CDB. Though the case was quite different, the Federal Court considered 
decision 109 Ib 146. However, it held that it would not need to examine whether the CDB 
was private-law or public-law in nature; and in any case, it bound the Federal Banking 
Commission neither to interpret the Banking Act, nor to its tasks as a supervisory body.
31
 
Thus, the Federal Court had not only reduced the importance of the CDB as self-
regulation, but also indicated in an obiter dictum that the description of the CDB as a 
private contract was no longer certain. In its decision 125 IV 139 (1999), the Federal 
Court once again reduced the importance of the CDB and the banking sector [p. 262] de-
regulation that it constituted. For the interpretation of the penal provision of Article 
305ter StGB (money laundering), the CDB was, it said, merely an aid to interpretation.
32
 
This is the stage, in the intersections between the discourses of economics, 
politics, law and scholarship, at which the CDB network finds itself today, although it 
continues to be disputed whether the CDB is to be classed under private or public law.
33
 
                                                 
30
 See, eg, Art 305ter (2), introduced by the BG of 18 March 1994, in force since 1 August 1994 (official 
collection of Swiss law 1994 1614 1618; BBl 1993 III 277), and the Swiss Federal Council‘s message of 17 
June 1996 on money laundering: BBl 1996 III 1101. On the fight against terrorism, see Art 1 of CDB 2003. 
31
 Federal Court decision 111 Ib 127, 127et seq. 
32
 Federal Court decision 125 IV 139, E. 3d, 144 et seq: ‗While as regards the demands on verification of 
identity the message refers to the model role of the CDB, and the duties of care on financial intermediaries 
now introduced in the Money-laundering Act are in the words of the message meant to form the criterion 
for the care to be observed in financial transactions in accordance with Art 305ter Abs 1 StGB, this can of 
course not mean that the degree of care when receiving assets required by the penal provision is as it were 
absorbed into the relevant rules of the CDB. The CDB has to do with rules of professional etiquette, 
formulated by the Swiss Bankers‘ Association, to which the signatory banks submit. They are an 
instrument of ethical self-regulation, and serve primarily to uphold the reputation of the profession (Article 
1 CDB) and thereby the interests of the banks, but are also protective as being self-protection against 
unclear situations that might lead to claims for damages. That they further lay claim to fleshing out ‗the 
concept of the care required by the circumstances when receiving assets (Article 305ter StGB) is not 
binding on the criminal-court judge—for all one‘s recognition for self-regulatory efforts‘. 
33
 In favour of the classification under private law, most recently, Marti, ‗Aufgabenteilung zwischen Staat 
und Privaten auf dem Gebiet der Rechtsetzung‘ (n 16 above) 1158 et seq, and A Marti, ‗Selbstregulierung 
anstelle staatlicher Gesetzgebung?‘ (2000) 101 ZBL 561 at 576. For allocation to public law, see, recently, 
U Häfelin and G Müller, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht (Zürich, Schulthess, 2002) fn 1060. Allocation to 
Centrally, the newest version, CDB 2003, is structured as follows: the Swiss Bankers‘ 
Association concludes the agreement with the signatory banks for a period of five years 
in each case.
34
 The governmental Federal Banking Commission checks whether the 
arrangement meets the requirements of the Money-laundering Act (Geldwäschereigesetz, 
GwG).
35
 The CDB sees itself as a piece of regulated professional etiquette which—in 
order, in accordance with Article 1, ‗to uphold the reputation of the Swiss banking 
industry at home and abroad‘—fleshes out the statutorily-regulated duties of care in the 
Money-laundering Act and the Criminal Code, while ‗normal banking business … 
[ought] not to be hampered thereby‘. For the duties of care [p. 263] where there is a 
heightened risk of money-laundering, the CDB refers to national law, namely, the Federal 
Banking Commission regulation.
36
 Articles 2–9 CDB regulate the specific duties of care 
and define their scope. With Article 10, the signatory banks authorise a review body to 
monitor compliance with the CDB, and notify the CDB supervisory commission and the 
governmental Federal Banking Commission of infringements. The supervisory 
commission, set up to investigate breaches, informs the Federal Banking Commission of 
its decisions (Article 12, especially 12(9)). Finally, an arbitration tribunal will, upon a 
complaint brought by the Swiss Bankers‘ Association against the bank concerned, hand 
down a final decision as to whether there has or has not been a violation of the terms of 
the agreement (Article 13). 
                                                                                                                                                 
private law while maintaining the bindingness of fundamental rights is advocated by M Schefer, 
‗Grundrechtliche Schutzpflichten und die Auslagerung staatlicher Aufgaben‘ (2002) 10 Aktuelle Juristische 
Praxis (AJP) 1131 at 1139 et seq. 
34
 The most recent dating from 7 April 2008: see n 25 above. 
35
 See, especially, Arts 16 and 42 GwG; see also J-B Zufferey and Expertengruppe Finanzmarktaufsicht, 
Finanzmarktregulierung und -aufsicht in der Schweiz. Schlussbericht (Bern, 2000) N 251, and 
Eidgenössische Finanzverwaltung, Geldwäschereibekämpfung in der Schweiz (Bern, 2003) 43, 
Arbeitsgruppe KYC, Sorgfaltspflichten von Banken und Effektenhändlern bei Geldwäscherei, 
Terrorismusfinanzierung und Beziehungen zu politisch exponierten Personen, 2005, available at: 
http://www.ebk.admin.ch/d/archiv/2002/pdf/neu090702-02d.pdf (last visited 8 December 2006) 12, and the 
explanations by the Bankers‘ Association at http://www.swissbanking.org/home/allgemein.htm (last visited 
8 December 2006). On all this, see also Nobel, Schweizerisches Finanzmarktrecht (n 6 above) § 6 N 10, §9 
N 40 et seq, especially N 55 et seq and § 11 N 27. 
36
 Art 1(3) CDB 2003; Regulation of the Confederal Banking Commission on the Prevention of Money-
Laundering of 18 December 2002. 
This concludes my reconstruction of the evolution of the CDB and of the social 
systems affected by the CDB.
37
 This reconstruction of developments to date, since the 
emergence of the CDB in 1977, has shown the following: the Federal Court‘s decision 
109 Ib 146, which I have commented on, had largely allocated the CDB to private law 
and thus given full leeway to its experimental programme. It initially sparked off 
vehement criticism from legal scholars, who stressed the lack of internal legal 
consistency in the Federal Court‘s ruling, especially with the concept of the democratic 
state under rule of law, thus showing that the decision could not bring stability. The 
immediately ensuing exploratory moves by the CDB network chiefly served the goal of 
keeping the network in the sphere of private law and thus free from political 
instrumentalisation, albeit without wishing to lose its link with politics.
38
 However, 
because of repeated scandals and larger political events,
39
 as well as the criticisms of the 
conflict with rule-of-law principles by legal scholars, this could not be maintained. 
Instead, the academic critique, on the one hand, and the scandals and broader events, on 
the other, engendered politically-led legislative impulses that reduced the CDB‘s 
importance as self-regulation, and increasingly subjected it to political structures. Even 
today, the economic, political and legal systems have yet to find lasting stability in their 
co-evolution in the area of the CDB, something which is reflected in the continuing 
criticisms of the doctrinal classification of the CDB as private law by legal scholars.
40
 
[p. 264] I shall cast an eye below over the law‘s neighbouring disciplines, in order 
to sound out the conditions for some possibilities of overcoming the crisis.
41
 At the centre 
is the thesis that, while legal science had identified the new-style co-operationism 
between the state and private persons as the starting point for the continuing irritations—
which are at the point of intersection of a clash of discourses of Babylonian 
                                                 
37
 For the dogmatic presentation of the CDB, see the relevant literature, eg, Nobel, Schweizerisches 
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 On the call to bring the neighbour sciences into jurisprudence, see P Gauch, ‗Die Fehlerwelt der Juristen‘ 
in Festschrift für Heinz Rey (Zürich, Schulthess, 2003) fn 19 et seq. 
proportions—it was unable to respond properly to these new-style irritations with the old 
rigid concepts, which also ignored the emergence of network-type organisations bound 
up with co-operationism. Consequently, it needs a theory which is able to deal with the 
dynamic co-evolution of the various discourses involved. I shall employ evolutionary 
theory for this, and, in the process, attempt to make the natural-science concept of 
morphogenesis bear fruit. 
II. THE MORPHOGENESIS OF HYBRID NETWORKS 
According to Kämper and Schmidt, the point with networks is not the harmonisation of 
functional systems, still less the integration of society.
42
 My analysis of the co-
evolutionary search-moves around the CDB network to date, however, points in precisely 
the opposite direction: the CDB network—and very generally, hybrid networks located 
between the social sub-systems of society—may constitute strategies of these social sub-
systems in order to retain their own specific system nature and respond as far as 
necessary to contradictory irritations simultaneously.
43
 What is involved here is nothing 
less than the social integrative function of evolution.
44
 However, some elucidation is 
called for, as follows. 
[p. 265] It has more than once been pointed out that hybrid networks are an 
institutional reaction to ambivalent, contradictory or paradoxical requirements.
45
 
Institutionally, this response means redundancy, ie, the system reacts to particular events 
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 G Teubner, ‗Das Recht hybrider Netzwerke‘ (2001) 165 Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht und 
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zum Risikomanagement (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1995) 31 et seq. 
by repeatedly reducing the possible modes of behaviour.
46
 Since the heightened demands 
from the environment cannot be escaped, the system at this point comes closer to the 
complexity of the environment.
47
 This process in which the system lowers its internal 
consistency in one sub-area may, borrowing from the natural sciences, be called 
morphogenesis.
48
 In fact, the CDB network is responding simultaneously—as will 
immediately be described in more detail—to at least three paradoxical demands from the 
environment, which result from the repeated banking scandals and the calls (admittedly 
uncomfortable for the economic system) to restrain economic logic. First, though, I wish 
to go into the concept of morphogenesis as further developed by the natural sciences in 
recent years, so as to use it as a metaphor (ie an outline solution that provides inspiration) 
in order to describe the function of hybrid networks in the evolution of social systems.
49
 
Recent natural-science theories of morphogenesis fit almost precisely with 
Kauffman‘s concept of spontaneous order, exploited by Amstutz for legal theory. As SA 
Kauffman showed, not only does a system‘s evolution come from the selection of 
suitable variations, but the selection must also meet with an internal so-called 
spontaneous order, which is what makes the evolution of a system possible at all.
50
 This 
spontaneous order keeps the system in a condition in which it is best prepared for 
evolutionary processes. Kauffman has shown that systems are able to respond to 
irritations from outside when their epistatic connectivity
51
 is K = 2. A [p. 266] crystal with 
K = 1 is, in contrast, unreceptive to external irritations, while with a higher connectivity 
of K = N - 1, the system drifts into chaos at practically the slightest touch. Put more 
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effects of another. If, then, variant a leads to phenotype A and variant b to phenotype B, but the 
combination ab results only in phenotype A, then a is epistatic to b. 
simply, the elements of the system must be bound loosely enough to be able to take on 
the irritations ‗at the edge of chaos‘, but not too loose for the system to be unable to 
maintain itself as such despite the irritations.
52
 The place, or ‗unit of selection‘, where 
evolution first becomes possible along with the maintenance of intrinsic rationality is not 
the system in its entirety—which would be unable to effect the necessary adaptation. 
Instead, the system differentiates particular areas that have to accomplish this adaptation, 
and which are, to this end, coupled with the corresponding environment.
53
 
This concept of spontaneous order has now been taken up by recent theories of 
morphogenesis: according to Harrison, morphogenesis means the emergence of a 
complex system from a simpler one, a process that presupposes internal spontaneous 
order.
54
 A central place in the process of morphogenesis is taken up by the interactions 
between the dynamic elements of the system: on the one hand, changes in the system‘s 
relationship to its environment must be grasped quickly and precisely, and communicated 
within the system; on the other, change should be set in motion in the system in the other 
direction.
55
 In the case of cells, the interplay between spontaneous order and change in 
form lies in a complex bio-mechanical and chemical process, in which—to put it in a 
nutshell—in a first step, the cell bio-mechanically ‗feels‘ its position (form) in its 
environment, and thus also ‗feels‘ the environment as such; then, this information is sent 
to the genome in the cell‘s nucleus, and finally, the genome sets off a gene cascade, in 
order to set off further changes on the desired path of morphogenesis. Put simply, then, 
morphogenic changes are set in motion, are then checked against the position aimed at in 
the system, and against the position relative to the system‘s environment, and, in a 
feedback loop, are checked against the changes aimed at, and then in accordance with this 
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result and the morphogenesis [p. 267] aimed at, and the new changes in turn are set off, 
etc.
56
 This morphogenic loop is, however, only one source of the change. Equally 
decisive are the aforementioned spontaneous order, and the rigid geometric constraints to 
which the system is subject, and along which it evolves.
57
 
If this image of spontaneous order and morphogenesis is applied to the case of 
hybrid networks, it may be concluded that a system—in our case that of the CDB, mainly 
the economy, but also politics—will differentiate a particularly flexible sub-order if it has 
to respond to intensive and complex irritations from the environment. The system will do 
so by lowering its coherence, ie, bringing about a process towards a more complex 
form—while simultaneously maintaining its own autopoiesis. While the sub-order‘s 
specific rationality ensures a certain resistance to evolution (form), its dynamic elements 
will be sufficiently loosely linked to react to the irritations from the environment—but 
only so loosely as always to allow the sub-area‘s specific rationality to be maintained. 
The form of the hybrid network with its particularly loosely-linked elements is, then—as 
Teubner has shown—particularly appropriate whenever internal variations have to be 
formed out of contradictory or even paradoxical high-intensity irritations.
58
 In effect, the 
point for the system is, thus, to exploit the network in order to revamp the relationship 
between function, performance and reflection within the system in such a way that it can 
react as optimally as possible to intensive, complex and even contradictory demands from 
the environment without endangering its intrinsic rationality.
59
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This adaptation of the system now occurs in a morphogenic feedback loop along 
the system‘s intrinsic constraints: at the loci of the structural couplings, the system ‗feels‘ 
its form and its position in the environment, and, from this information, the system takes 
on variations within the context of the sub-system‘s specific rationality, which are 
subjected to [p. 268] selection (change or non-change to the previous elements and 
structures). The modification brought about by the selection, as well as the rejection of 
modification, are in turn ‗felt‘ for their position within the system and—again with the 
help of structural couplings—so is the position in the environment, which can now set off 
new variations and selections in a further loop. 
The special thing about the form of the hybrid network is that it can 
simultaneously take up manifold structural couplings with various systems. This gives 
more importance to the morphogenic loop, in which the results of previous selections can 
be squared with the internal and external demands upon the system, and, if need be, 
corrections can be made, until, in the long run, a punctuated equilibrium between the 
system and its environment is reached. In this light, the morphogenic loop is the 
precondition for a system‘s being able to take on intensive demands from its surrounding 
systems while at the same time maintaining its own rationality, and to aim at a punctuated 
equilibrium with its surrounding systems. 
I wish now to use the specific example of the CDB network to show that, in this 
case, the economy responded to intensive and contradictory irritations with the form of 
the hybrid network, and thus differentiated a specific sub-order which created the 
conditions for the possibility of co-evolution for the economy with its surrounding 
systems through morphogenic loops. On the basis of the model of a poly-contextual 
society,
60
 I shall further seek to draw normative conclusions from the observations 
derived from evolutionary theory. 
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Here, however, there is a need to take account of intrinsically legal constraints in 
the form of the rigid compulsory connections of legal doctrine. The institutions of 
organisation and contract in law build upon long traditions, whereas the forms between 
organisation and contract and between the state and private organisation were banished 
with the emergence of the police state.
61
 Thus, there is no updated pool of elements that is 
able—without further ado—to be linked up with today‘s [p. 269] legal doctrine, from 
which suitable variations for the new types of phenomenon can be selected. Additionally, 
in today‘s post-modern poly-contextual society, pre-liberal solutions for a stratified 
society can be considered only with great caution. Thus, the locating of new phenomena, 
such as hybrid networks between government administration and private persons cannot 
be linked up with existing concepts, and the creation of a corresponding field of law ex 
nihilo is out of the question, even if only because of the internal constraints of legal 
doctrine. This legal doctrine watches too rigidly over the consistency of new norm 
variations with the existing norms. Accordingly, the new-style phenomena located 
between the old dichotomies of contract and organisation or of state and private 
organisation must be found a place in these existing dichotomies, although, of course, 
their ‗reverse side‘ has to be taken account of within the relevant legal order. 
III. THE CDB IN THE LIGHT OF EVOLUTIONARY 
NETWORK THEORY 
III.1 Development of Paradoxical Demands: Co-operation of Competitors 
The Texon scandal may definitely also be seen as one that was internal to politics. This is 
because Swiss policy, which profits from the banking business through taxes and levies, 
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was afraid of falling further into disrepute and felt, accordingly, under pressure to act 
correctively against the banks.
62
 However, for manifold reasons, such as complexity and 
technicality, limited means and privatisation—in addition to the globalisation of both 
knowledge and resources—politics had failed to regulate the dynamic economic sector of 
the banks authoritatively through traditional legislation.
63
 Furthermore, the avoidance of 
political regulation that might have hampered ‗normal banking business‘ was a primary 
[p. 270] objective of Swiss banks.
64
 As a result of further scandals and major political 
events, this aim could not fully be achieved.
65
 But the objective of not letting ‗normal 
banking business‘ be ‗hampered‘, thus averting a politically-imposed straitjacket (and let 
it be it noted that the sub-area‘s specific rationality under the sign of extreme plasticity 
clearly shines through), is still, to this day, formulated with noteworthy clarity in the 
CDB: 
This agreement lays down, with binding effect, valid rules of good conduct in bank 
management as a code of professional ethics. They should put in concrete terms certain 
points of due diligence governed by the Anti Money Laundering Act (Article 3 through 5 
of the AMLA) and ‗the diligence that can be reasonably expected under the 
circumstances‘ (Article 305ter of the Swiss Penal Code). Special due diligence rules for 
business relations and transactions involving higher risks are set forth in the Anti-Money-
Laundering Ordinance by the Swiss Federal Banking Commission.—This is not intended 
to impede normal banking business.
66
 
How could this objective be achieved? To avoid an inconvenient straitjacket 
through political regulation, politics had to be irritated by the economy in such a way as 
to eliminate the preconditions for politics to take regulatory action. If, however, 
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 Article 1(3) CDB 2003. 
individual economic actors had unilaterally and voluntarily taken political instructions as 
politico-ethical guidelines and had thus restricted their economic possibilities in the light 
of politics, then clearly these individual banks would have faced considerable competitive 
disadvantages in comparison with non-compliant competitors—without necessarily 
getting rid of the problem for politics. A unilateral adaptation by banks to the demands of 
politics was thus manifestly illusory because of the constraints immanent in the economic 
system.
67
 
As we know, ordo-liberal theory (a German school of neo-liberalism) turned 
liberalism on its head by recognising that a market regime is not the consequence of, but 
a precondition for, the market mechanism.
68
 In [p. 271] the light of this ordo-liberal theory, 
it was up to the banks jointly to set up a market regime that simultaneously and equally 
restrained the economic possibilities of the biggest players in the banking sector and was, 
therefore, at least within the circle of important market participants, or the most part 
competitively neutral in its effects, ie, cartelised the new duties of care.
69
 Joint action to 
this end by the competitors would, however, have brought considerable dangers. By 
founding a formal organisation, the competitors would have come so close together as to 
call the fundamental premises of the market into question, whilst, at the same time, 
bringing the risk of corresponding reactions from politics and law. The banks thus found 
themselves facing the paradoxical requirement to co-operate with each other whilst, at the 
same time, maintaining competition. 
The form of the network does not—as anti-trust law70 might suggest—resolve this 
paradox by [p. 272] suppressing one side of the organisation, but instead unfolds the 
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paradox by using both co-operation and competition. How does this look in the CDB 
case? In the CDB network, regulations were formulated in which the economy, to some 
extent, took the environmental demands into account—specifically, in the banking area, it 
restricted the possibilities of business action. However, since this restriction of economic 
rationality in bilateral arrangements was stabilised through contract law, as, from a 
certain threshold of collective market power onward, the result was the above-mentioned 
cartelisation. This means that the arrangement stabilised in the contracts became 
competitively neutral, since one market participant no longer competed with another by 
underbidding the established standard. The network, in structural coupling to the legal 
system through the various bilateral, but always identical and inter-related, contractual 
arrangements, thus obtained control over the opportunistic conduct of its participants in a 
specific sub-area of competition, while the network participants continued to compete 
with each other in the other areas.
71
 
The economy was thus able to overcome the blockade which threatened the 
banking sector with paradoxical demands, through a network-type organisation which 
was flexible enough to unfold the paradox by introducing several levels. The network-
type web of contracts was able, on the one hand, to secure the very co-operation that 
could meet the political demands, while, on the other hand, this co-operation—in the 
form of the conclusion of a contract between the individual bank and a neutral network 
centre—was so loose and so limited in content that not only was the form of competition 
maintained for the economic system, but this could correspondingly also be signalled to 
the other systems, especially the legal system.
72
 This simultaneously minimised the target 
area for political or legal interventions and thus averted excessive influence by legislative 
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policy; as the network was arranged, and, as this was also perceived by the Federal Court, 
it was meant to constitute only a loosely associated bundle of private contracts. 
How, then, is this re-entry of organisation into contract to be classified legally? 
In the law of contract, it can be brought into the content of the contract (if need be, 
interpreted normatively) without problems.
73
 A sober glance at anti-trust law, however, 
raises doubts as to whether the CDB ought not to be brought under the Cartel Act.
74
 We 
may regard the CDB as a strategy of the economy for organising the sub-area of banking 
in such a way that it can absorb complex and intensive irritations from the environment 
on the basis of its internal order (in SA Kauffman‘s sense) and respond to them flexibly 
(through morphogenic loops).
75
 Thus, it would, against the background of the model of a 
poly-contextual society, be downright fatal for the law to force the network into the 
traditional dichotomies of competition versus co-operation, or contract versus 
organisation. It would be fatal to describe it as an illicit competition agreement and thus 
suppress the organisation element, or else construe it as an organisation, which would fail 
to take the central role of the contract into account. Therefore, from this viewpoint, the 
so-called re-entry of the organisation into the form of the contract deserves protection—at 
least in so far as it allows the economy both to absorb [p. 273] irritations from the 
environment better, and correspondingly to orient its structure better to the demands of 
the surrounding systems.
76
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However, the network not only allows the economy to absorb intensive 
contradictory, or even paradoxical, demands, but it also has a socially integrative 
function. What this socially integrative function of the CDB network consists of, and 
what part the morphogenic loops mentioned play, I shall now proceed to explain. 
III.2 Compatibilisation of Contradictory Rationalities 
After the Texon scandal, the banking sector not only had to create a market regime while 
simultaneously maintaining competition, but was additionally confronted with a second 
contradictory demand. The banking sector had to come closer to politics while, at the 
same time, keeping it at arm‘s length: the CDB network was called into being primarily 
to cushion pressures from international and national politics and make them compatible 
with the banking sector.
77
 Correspondingly, connections with this political dimension 
were established from the outset, first by bringing in the National Bank as the network 
centre, and in the second phase of the CDB, by integrating the Federal Banking 
Commission as the top supervisory body for the network. Nonetheless, it was always an 
[p. 274] intention of the CDB to keep the influence of politics as ‗business-compatible‘ as 
possible, something clearly expressed in Article 1 of the CDB mentioned earlier.
78
 
How, then, was the economy able to use the network to respond to the paradoxical 
requirement to include politics while, simultaneously keeping it at arm‘s length? I wish 
here to distinguish two dimensions: first, communication about the need for collectively 
binding-decisions, and second, the problem of legitimation. 
                                                                                                                                                 
well be compatible with that premiss for firms, for the most varied purposes and on specific points—ie, 
product-, project- or time-related—to change from competitors to co-operating partners: see H-J Bunte 
(ed), Kommentar zum deutschen und europäischen Kartellrecht (Neuwied, Luchterhand, 2004) § 1, fn 161; 
C Kirchner, ‗Unternehmensorganisation und Vertragsnetz‘ in C Ott and H-B Schäfer (eds), Ökonomische 
Analyse des Unternehmensrechts : Beiträge zum 3. Travemünder Symposium zur ökonomischen Analyse 
des Rechts (Heidelberg, Physica Verlag, 1993); see also P Zurkinden, HR Trüeb and J Rutishauser, Das 
neue Kartellgesetz Handkommentar (Zürich, Schulthess, 2004), on Art 6 KG (Cartel Act). 
77
 See above Section I.2. 
78
 Note 66 above. T Strulik, ‗Governance globalisierter Finanzmärkte: Policy-Netzwerke und 
Kontextsteuerung im Bankensystem‘ in J Sydow and A Windeler (eds), Steuerung von Netzwerken 
(Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 2000) at 322, points out that something similar is true of the international 
level, too. However, he portrays an almost harmonious picture of the co-operation of the economy and 
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II.2.(a) Communication about the Need for Collectively-binding Decisions 
If the economy wishes to signal the need (or else non-need) for collectively binding-
decisions to the political sphere, this communication cannot occur just anyhow and 
anywhere. If we take the model of the polycontextural society seriously, then, because of 
the unbridgeable autonomy of the various systems and of the corresponding Babylonian 
confusion of tongues, there is no direct communication channel between the economy 
and politics through which this information could pass without further ado. And 
correspondingly, even in the network the various rationalities cannot ‗find each other‘ in 
such a way that, à la Savigny, they would all be within some all-embracing world-spirit.
79
 
From the viewpoint of systems theory and evolutionary theory, the economy is left with 
no alternative but to irritate politics at the locus of structural coupling by which the 
necessary variations are formed and selected.
80
 Although the chances of success in 
bringing about the desired selections in a surrounding system through irritations have to 
be rated as poor, the CDB network did manage to install relatively effective morphogenic 
structures by simultaneously linking up to several structural couplings: 
(i) Organisation and Collective Actor as Structural Coupling 
Whereas the network appears to the law primarily as a bundle of contracts, because of the 
network effect, it does, at the same time, present itself to politics as an organisation, or 
more precisely, as a collective actor. This enables the relevant sub-area of the economy to 
appear to legislative policy as a point of identification at which politics obtains 
information about the other [p. 275] system, and, in particular, about the conditions for 
collectively-binding decisions, and communicates the possibility conditions for future 
collectively-binding decisions, in order to test the chances for achieving political 
programmes on the basis of reactions. The economy, for its part, reads this 
communication about planned collectively-binding decisions as a cost, and, in turn, uses 
the organisation to communicate the need or lack of need for collectively-binding 
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decisions to the political sphere.
81
 For the banking sector, this possibility of 
communicating to the political sphere a lack of need for legislative intervention about 
duties of due diligence is of central importance. This is because it is in this way that 
politics could, and, indeed, can be relatively quickly and reliably made aware of the 
efforts to reach a punctuated equilibrium with politics within the economy. In our case, 
politics, too, was pressing for a solution to the crisis (within politics) of Switzerland as a 
banking centre, and, from the viewpoint of the economy, the slowly grinding and (for the 
economy) incalculable mills of legislation should, if it all possible, not be set in motion at 
all.
82
 
(ii) Contract as Structural Coupling 
While the necessary communication between the banking sector and legislative politics 
could not have been established through the structural coupling of the contract alone, the 
contractual incorporation of the National Bank, a political actor of great renown, as 
network centre, made it easier, especially at the beginning, after the influential Texon 
scandal, for the network to get a hearing from it. This is because, through the contract as 
structural coupling via which projects of various systems could, using law, be stabilised 
for a definite duration, the National Bank was able to bring the concerns of politics 
almost directly into the network.
83
 Alongside this specific ‗release‘ of a narrow range of 
irritations, however, the irritations at the site of the structural coupling were, at the same 
time, limited and an important pre-condition for the compatibilisation of the systems 
created by it: the network participants gave up their autonomy in two respects, so as to 
enable co-operation in the network. Not only did the economic actors involved in the 
network abstain from any actions which, while bringing them competitive advantages on 
the market, put co-operation in the [p. 276] network into question, but also reduced their 
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autonomy in mutually shaping their business relations, while the government 
administration involved also restricted its own possibilities of acting in the banking sector 
by way of the hierarchical legislative process.
84
 
 
This self-restraint of the systems involved presupposes their maintenance of their 
respective intrinsic rationalities. Thus, the example of the early CDB shows that the 
network could not be stabilised with a weakly legitimated public institution—in this case 
the National Bank, which while it did have the necessary reputation, lacked any suitable 
statutory basis.
85
 This is because if the network positions itself at the intersection of the 
economy and politics in order to influence the framework conditions of a market 
decisively, then it is dependent on the link to the power and legitimation resources of 
politics. We shall come back to this.
86
 
The network thus constitutes an institutional strategy of society’s mutually 
estranged sub-systems in order to have dealings with each other on condition that they 
maintain their own intrinsic rationalities, in search of a punctuated equilibrium. To this 
extent, the chameleonic network form has evolutionary importance in rendering 
contradictory rationalities compatible.
87
 The general picture is that the economy, using 
the structural couplings, ‗feels‘ its own position in relation to the demands of politics, in 
order to set off, on the basis of this information, changes in the sub-area of the banking 
sector through the structural linkage of the contract, which will, in turn, be brought to the 
attention of politics through the structural coupling of organisation, and checked for 
success, etc. 
These morphogenic processes not only have to be respected, but also normatively 
underpinned, from the legal viewpoint; but, here, neither a reconstruction of the network 
solely as a disconnected bundle of contracts nor solely as an organisation will suffice; just 
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as neither one from a purely economic nor from a purely political viewpoint will. Instead, 
the need is first to secure the re-entry of the organisation form into the content of the 
contracts in such a way that the process of squaring off between the systems of the 
economy and politics can take place at the site of the structural coupling of the 
organisation. And secondly, the various differing rationalities that come together in the 
network must be secured [p. 277] against one another.
88
 In summary, what is involved here 
is the institutional guaranteeing of the network in the light of its evolutionary function. 
But this is only one side of the coin. The contractual form—as the Federal Court‘s 
decision 109 Ib 149 shows—also offers good protection against claims and interference 
by third parties: the network ought, by no means, to appear to the law as an organisation. 
This is why third parties can be directed to its individual nodes, which, in turn, appeal 
against the accusation of breach of the law to the super-ordinate political aspect of the 
network effect, ie, the market regime. But this opens up a legitimation problem for the 
network, which I shall now examine. 
II.2.(b) Legitimation 
II.2.(b)(i) The Problem 
In the case of the CDB, the banking sector could not find a solution to this crisis without 
any political involvement at all from the outset. Initially, the banks needed a neutral 
arbitration agency, both to overcome the competition and set co-operation in motion.
89
 
Thereafter, the involvement of a political actor helped the network to obtain a better 
hearing from politics. But this was not all: in order to implement a market regime, 
economic rationality needed the political symbols of constraint and indisposability. 
But what is actually meant by this? It is already inherent in the concept of a 
market regime that it should apply to a whole sub-area of the economy and consequently 
affect a multiplicity of market participants at various levels, imposing restrictions upon 
their economic possibilities, and that it should, in the last instance, also be imposed 
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coercively. If, however, law—associated with the political symbol of constraint—is used 
instrumentally, for instance, as in our case, to secure a particular market regime, then the 
question of the legitimation of this law arises. The Swiss Federal Court decision 109 Ib 
146 commented upon above shows these issues clearly. What was being debated in 
decision 109 Ib 146 was the interests of the Treuhänder-Verband and its members. They 
had undergone a considerable competitive disadvantage from the new CDB arrangement, 
and yet were unable to influence the CDB—which had primarily been set up by the 
banks—in any way. Moreover, the reactions to the case clearly showed that purely 
private-law legitimation—legitimising the legal stabilisation of bilateral differentials by 
the free will of the participants, and the exclusion of third-party interests by [p. 278] the 
mechanism of the self-regulating market—was too weak to establish a permanent 
stabilisation, for the CDB network amounted to more than just a bundle of contracts.
90
 
Instead, the intended network effect, by combining overwhelming market power and 
incorporating politics, attained something which exceeded the sum of the individual 
contracts, namely, a comprehensive market regime—and did so in a key market of central 
political importance. Today, these issues are already signalled in law by the fact that the 
Cartel Act is inapplicable simply because of political exceptional clauses.
91
 The 
legitimation issues were accordingly not resolved by the traditional legitimation 
mechanisms of private law, but, in their stead, recourse had to be had to political 
legitimation mechanisms.
92
 
To obtain legitimation, it has to be admitted, the economy cannot copy the sort of 
ramified participatory procedures that serve to produce legitimacy for the democratic rule 
of law without denying its own rationality, which relies on lowering transaction costs.
93
 
In this respect, it is subject to the constraints intrinsic to its system. Accordingly, the 
economy must find another way of obtaining the political symbolism of constraint and, 
above all, of legitimation for its self-regulation. 
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In the CDB case, this was initially done by bringing a political actor into the 
network by contract. While the law enabled the rationalities involved in the contract to 
clothe their project in the form of law and thus link to the rule-of-law legitimation 
mechanisms, the involvement of politics was meant to convey the democratic aspects of 
legitimation.
94
 However, the co-operationist solution with the National Bank as network 
centre proved incapable of stabilisation, as the critique of the Federal Court decision 109 
Ib 146 from legal scholars shows: the National Bank already lacked a statutory basis for 
becoming involved in this area at all. Thus, despite its great political prestige, it could not 
adequately convey the democratic symbolism, thus creating the danger of the very 
political interventions that were to be averted. Correspondingly, structural changes were 
initiated in the network, in order to oppose this danger. The National Bank was replaced 
in the network by the politically better underpinned Federal Banking Commission. 
[p. 279] But even with the legislative mandate that the Federal Banking 
Commission possesses, a co-operationist combination of the economy and politics by 
contract would have been hard to stabilise. This is because the contractual combination 
between politics and the economy even threatens to break up the existing legitimation 
mechanisms of the democratic state under rule of law: if government administration is to 
be able to have dealings with other areas of society in co-operationist fashion, it must 
have the corresponding freedom to negotiate the ends and the means of this selfsame co-
operation. Here, the administration determines not just the way to the political goal, but 
increasingly also the goal itself, thus calling into question the administration‘s formal and 
material legality as (i) (central for the economy) the guarantor of the rule-of-law 
restraints on social happenings and (ii) (for society in general) the intermediary of 
democratic legitimation in the form of a developed participatory procedure.
95
 
Correspondingly, in the CDB network, the contractual connections between politics and 
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the economy were loosened. The political actor was replaced at the network centre by the 
banks‘ own trade organisation, while politics repositioned itself at the periphery of the 
network and took on the role of overall governmental supervision.
96
 In this way, the 
network arrangement was, on the one hand, brought closer to an unproblematical private-
law code of professional ethics, and, on the other, subjected to a public-law political 
framework system.
97
 These structural adjustments to the network justified the criticisms 
of the legal scholars who had sought to resolve the legitimation problem by extending the 
political demands and suppressing the contradictory demands of conflicting spheres of 
action.
98
 
With the partial retreat into the traditional dichotomies of public and private 
spheres, the network partially managed, through its withdrawal [p. 280] into more 
traditional self-regulation, to lessen the danger of politicisation through direct legislative 
intervention or through a judicial classification as public law, which would inevitably 
have seen the politicised ‗public interests‘ alienating the network from economic 
rationality. However, the CDB also lost a significant part of its capacity to adapt to the 
contradictory demands of conflicting rationalities: the economy‘s direct link to the 
symbiosis of law and politics to secure the symbol of legitimation through a contractual 
connection with politics was largely severed, and the possibility of morphogenesis was 
thus restricted. Admittedly, the morphogenic structures remained, in so far as the 
economy and politics could continue to perform exchanges (or, more precisely, to irritate 
each other) about the need for collective decisions at the locus of the structural coupling 
of organisation. And with the Federal Banking Commission, politics could continue to 
benefit from the banks‘ specific technical knowledge of how a functioning market regime 
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is to be constituted, and, at the same time, let its demands flow into the network—albeit 
no longer in the existing differentiated co-operationist fashion, but only in the sense of an 
ordre public.
99
 Politics thus lost influence over the details of the arrangement, and the 
economy now had no way of pushing the morphogenesis far enough for the political 
demands to be able to flow into the CDB directly via the structural coupling of the 
contract. Thus, today‘s numerous legal provisions in this connection are also pointers to 
the failures of the CDB as an experimental programme, at least, in its original 
radicality.
100
 And even if a sizeable core of self-regulation has been left, we nonetheless 
have to state that today‘s self-regulation—as the Federal Court decision 125 IV 139 
shows—cannot lead much further than a traditional code of professional ethics.101 
From the viewpoint of an evolutionary theory taking the model of a 
polycontextural society as its basis, this development of the CDB is regrettable. This is 
because the original CDB network with its morphogenic structures had proved to be a 
promising strategy for opening up contradictory, and even paradoxical, demands at the 
intersection of conflicting social systems. Thus an important contribution to the co-
evolution and integration of mutually estranged social systems was [p. 281] performed—
while simultaneously maintaining each of their own intrinsic rationalities.
102
 This does 
not mean that one should forget the difficulties that the CDB network raised for politics. 
Certainly, in my view, the withdrawal into the traditional dichotomy of private and public 
came far too early. This is because there definitely are possibilities for reconciling a 
network structure, especially one based on the structural coupling of the contract for the 
integration of the mutually estranged systems, with the need for legitimation. I shall 
briefly outline these approaches to solutions. 
II.2.(b)(ii) Rule-of-Law Legitimation Mechanisms 
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When it comes to rule-of-law legitimation mechanisms, very basically and in the 
framework of the traditional application of fundamental rights, the effect of political 
communication on the economic side of the network can be tested against the 
fundamental rights: 
(A) Freedom of the Private Person and Freedom of Thought 
To the extent that the administration grants private persons the possibility, through their 
entry into a co-operative relationship directly with the administration, of preventing a 
command-type procedure being commenced, the freedom of the private person is not a 
pre-requisite. It is only once the private person is faced with the option between ‗contract 
or command‘ that the decision in favour of freedom—pre-formed by the administration—
can be taken, in the light of the conduct demanded by it. The freedom traditionally pre-
supposed in private law (as freedom to do something or not) is here conferred by the 
administration. Åkerstrøm Andersen has persuasively pointed out that before this 
conferred freedom as a premise, all that remains is bare ‗freedom of thought‘ 
(Gewissensfreiheit). This freedom of thought constitutes the very residue of the 
traditionally presupposed freedom without preconditions that is due to human beings by 
virtue of their being human.
103
 The freedom conferred by the administration is thus far 
removed from the Kantian freedom, which has no prior cause, which is, transcendentally, 
a value in itself, and, as such, is, in principle, not dependent on sensuous or social needs, 
either.
104
 Here, the legitimating function of private law‘s delegation of self-organisation 
is almost completely absent, so that the co-operationist relationship between private 
persons and government administration is to be allocated to public law and its 
legitimation mechanisms, which are [p. 282] traditionally concerned with securing 
society‘s areas of freedom against the state, as well as with the legitimation of the 
                                                 
103
 N Åkerstrøm Andersen, ‗The Contractualisation of the Citizen—on the transformation of obligation into 
freedom‘ (2004) 10 Soziale Systeme 273–91. 
104
 I Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Hamburg, Felix Meiner, 1993/1787) 561 et seq; I Kant, Kritik der 
praktischen Vernunft (Hamburg, Felix Meiner, 1993/1788) 60 et seq; I Kant, ‗Metaphysische 
Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre‘ in Rechtslehre: Schriften zur Rechtsphilosophie (Berlin, Akademie 
Verlag, 1988/1797) 27 et seq. 
interventions that restrict freedom through the concept of the democratic rule of law.
105
 In 
the case of the CDB, the prospect of market regulation by legislative policy was not so 
immediate that the banks‘ freedom in the decision of whether and how to build self-
regulation would have to be regarded as mediated by the state. Instead, the proactive 
conduct of the banks in the course of the evolution of the CDB shows that the decisive 
thrusts towards self-regulation always came from the private side.
106
 
 Even if a case of self-regulation is—particularly on the criterion of freedom of 
decision—assigned to private law, we must first ask whether the governmental 
pressure for self-regulation or the pressure to co-operate infringes fundamental 
rights. Since free assent is constitutive for private self-regulation, a self-regulation 
imposed by governmental administrative units potentially constitutes an 
infringement of fundamental rights, which correspondingly has to be justified. 
Here we must also bear in mind the gradual evolution of the selfsame co-
operation and self-regulations which may very well start within the framework of 
the fundamental rights, but which may later cross the threshold to infringe 
fundamental rights. Or, in other words, a gradual increase in duties of co-
operation and self-regulation cannot justify an infringement of fundamental rights 
without further ado.
107
 For instance, the Federal Banking Commission ban on a 
CDB form upon which trustees could declare that the economic beneficiary, while 
known, would not be disclosed should correspondingly have been checked for 
compliance with fundamental rights.
108
 
 It should then be a principle that politics is not to be freed of its ensuring 
liability
109,
 whenever it is involved in a regulation or influences it. Accordingly, in 
a mixed hybrid network, the political [p. 283] communications of the public-law 
network nodes must be challengeable as a decision, so that higher priority ought 
also to be attributed to the justification of the administrative decision.
110
 Clearly, 
this does not mean that every corresponding court decision would have direct 
repercussions on the network and on the private-law contracts: in so far as the 
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network is to be described as a bundle of private contracts, any infringement of 
the private-law rationality which, in principle, stabilises the bipolarity of the 
contracting parties and excludes third-party interests would require special 
justification.
111
 However, alongside the possibility of demanding damages from 
the political actors, an appropriate judgment ought also to impose upon political 
actors a duty to act upon the network.
112
 
As an extension of this sort of mono-causal application of the fundamental rights 
against politics, the law has to call on the systems involved for a new way of applying 
them: a polycontextural application of the fundamental rights. This is because if politics 
can no longer be trusted with, nor be expected to handle, the constitutional shaping of the 
total polycontextural society, then the consequence is that each social sub-system has to 
be called on for a corresponding self-restraint, with—as its object—the legal liberation 
and, at the same time, the curbing of the system‘s specific rationality vis-à-vis internal 
spontaneous order and vis-à-vis other social sectors.
113
 This demand may be placed on 
the CDB network in various ways. In particular, the Federal Banking Commission, as the 
regulatory body, ought to call for this self-restraint when granting authorisation to the 
CDB in connection with the general clause of the Banking Act, which prescribes the 
ensuring of proper business conduct. And the courts should call for this sort of self-
restraint of economic rationality when—as in the Federal Court decision 109 Ib 146—
dealing with relevant cases. This sort of substantive self-restraint by the economy is often 
discussed under the heading of democratic legitimation mechanisms. I should like—again 
sketchily—to show how democratic legitimation mechanisms might be recast for these 
issues. 
[p. 284]  
II.2.(b)(iii) Democratic Legitimation Mechanisms 
According to such authors as Habermas or Grimm, new types of administrative conduct, 
detached from the traditional structures of the democratic rule of law, can secure 
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legitimation, above all, by supplementing recourse to normative grounds by a process of 
internal democratisation. This so-called internal democratisation can, according to area—
with the exception of the legal protection to be adapted to the new forms—result from 
participation in administration, ie institutionalisation of ombudsforms within the 
administration, court-like procedures, hearings and publications, involvement in 
decisions of those affected or their representatives, etc.
114
 As with the concept of the 
social state, the point is for the individuals, or the addressees of the administrative action, 
to be put into a position to able to cultivate and protect their interests and bring them to 
bear on decision-making processes. 
From the viewpoint of an evolutionary theory based upon systems theory, caution is, of 
course, in order here, since the polycontextural aspects of today‘s society, ie, the 
differentiation of society into various sub-systems, each functioning on a different 
intrinsic logic, have to be taken as the basis for the model of today‘s society, as 
achievements of modernity. Whether society‘s differentiation already contains—as in 
Teubner—a normative principle,115 or whether the observer has to take this 
differentiation as the basis for his model of society if he is to secure an adequate picture 
which he can orient himself by, need not be gone into here. This is because 
acknowledging the polycontextural society as a society of law can already point at the 
dangers, such as those described under the heading of Teubner‘s regulatory trilemma, 
which threaten if Habermas‘s proposals are implemented.116 Thus, in the light of 
evolutionary theory, we must be warned against any too direct interference with the 
complex, evolutionarily-grown structures of other sub-systems.
117
 The point must instead 
be—from the viewpoint of evolutionary theory—to support the system‘s internal 
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reorientation of function, performance and reflection through law, in such a way that the 
system [p. 285] can react optimally to intensive, complex and even contradictory 
environmental demands without endangering its own rationality.
118
 We shall come back 
to this. 
However, we certainly should follow Habermas in his finding that numerous 
forms of co-operation between the state and private persons, as in our case of the early 
CDB network, cannot meet the demands of politics for legitimate regulation. Although 
the economy does link up with politics, it still either fails to achieve, within the concrete 
co-operation, the re-entry of the political sphere, or succeeds only insufficiently. Today, 
too, the continual demands from many legal scholars for a more strongly reinforced 
return of the network into public law indicate that the CDB still lacks legitimation, so that 
the banking sector has not yet met the political demands with regard to a punctuated 
equilibrium. How, then, can these demands of politics on the economy be supported by a 
polycontextural application of the fundamental rights? 
II.2.(b)(iv) Evolutionary-Procedural Legitimation Mechanisms 
The statements so far have identified the morphogenic structures
119
 of co-operationist 
and, in particular, network-type arrangements as an evolutionary strategy for adapting to 
the polycontextural society. This sort of morphogenic structure, supported by law, thus 
makes it easier for the various social systems to enter into dealings with each other, 
whereby the rationalities rebounding from each other within these structures have to be 
secured against each other by reconfigured fundamental rights. 
The difficult constitutional question now is how the different systems can be 
brought—by law—to take into account the differentiation of their surrounding systems 
and their most important demands, in order to obtain a punctuated equilibrium. To apply 
this to the CDB case, how, on the one hand, can politics be induced, despite a political 
programme that has to be implemented and despite continuing ensuring liability, to 
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respect economic freedom even within self-regulation (as the re-entry of the economy 
into politics)? And how, on the other hand, can the economy be induced to enter into the 
political demands for a legitimate CDB network (as re-entry of politics into the 
rationality of the economy)—especially if legislative interventions by politics are to be 
avoided on grounds of the legislator‘s being overburdened for the specific object, [p. 286] 
while, at the same time, the law in a polycontextural society has neither the knowledge 
nor the possibility of implanting specific, effective regulations into the economy?
120
 
We can be helped over this uncertainty as to the right law by a procedural 
approach, as described by Wiethölter. He—much as Habermas has done—calls for the 
continual renewal of the integration of the society of law through the involvement of 
society in the production and justification of law, thus simultaneously creating a new type 
of legitimation.
121
 
In a procedural method, the courts, in particular, need to have more dealings than 
before with the differentiated polycontextural society. The job of finding socially-
adequate norms must no longer be delegated solely through private autonomy to the 
economy and through legislation to politics. In the difficult task of finding the legal needs 
of the polycontextural society, the courts are, of course, supported by the law’s 
neighbouring sciences: law is structurally coupled with these (for example, legal 
sociology, legal philosophy, legal history, legal psychology, etc), first, via legal theory as 
the reflective mechanism of law, and secondly, in a narrowly limited normative fashion, 
through (mainly politically) inserted general clauses as well as norm references. The 
systems in conflict, such as the economy, the family or politics, are, however, just as far 
from science—be it economic, family or political science—as from the law. 
If, then, as stated above, the need is to promote possibilities for the mutually-
estranged sub-systems of society to observe each other and respond to the various 
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demands of the surrounding systems, then attention must be directed not just to the 
structural couplings—which, as we have seen, enable systems to perceive themselves as 
the environment for the other systems in each case—but also to the structures on the basis 
of which systems respond to demands from their environment while taking account of 
their own intrinsic rationality. If these morphogenic structures are so threatened by one 
system that other systems can no longer adapt their operations and structures to the 
changing environment, the law should protect them. This could be done by, for example, 
a judicially-established obligation to contract. In particular, such a obligation to contract 
could be applied in cases like the Federal Court decision 109 Ib 146, when the political 
legitimation demands on a market regime established by the economy are not covered 
because of structural shortcomings. This, however, calls for some further explanation, as 
follows. 
[p. 287] From the viewpoint of legal doctrine, decisions intended to promote a 
balancing of the relationship between function, performance and reflection within the 
system—in the CDB case to demand re-entry of the political demands into economic 
rationality—can be located in so-called niches122: First, possible niches in which 
variations with contents capable of compatibilisation may be formed should be sought in 
the legal sub-system coupled with the observed rationality, in our case, law of contract. 
For the most part, such niches can be found in the form of reservation norms, which act 
as signal norms pointing to the issues in conflict. Such conflict norms are, as a rule, 
couched openly, in order to be able to grasp the evolutionary dimension of the co-
existence of systems. Traditionally, in Swiss law of contract, the general clauses on 
public morals (Article 19 f OR, Article 27 f CC), good faith (Article 2 CC) and the 
application of the law (Article 1 CC) take on this role.
123
 Corresponding niches, through 
which the CDB network could be brought to render political demands compatible with 
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the rationality of the economic sub-system are, however, also present in anti-trust law.
124
 
If the niche and the conflict norm have been set up, the need is then to identify the 
specific legal sub-rationality that produces consistency within the sub-systems. Only in 
this way can the reason for the conflict, on the one hand, and the external form of the 
evolutionary capacity, on the other, be recognised. This specific legal sub-rationality is to 
be gathered from the relevant precedents (empirically), because it is not already laid 
down fixedly from the outset, but is constructed through the applicable cases.
125
 
Such a decision ought not only to protect the morphogenic structure in the case 
before judgment, but, simply because of its coarse structure, should also set off a 
complex process of ‗social‘ law-making in an interplay of law, scholarship and the 
systems involved in the conflict. These systems are led by the judicial considerations to 
generate new variations, which are, in turn, checked by legal scholars for doctrinal 
consistency, and then, if need be, are presented to the courts for selection, [p. 288] perhaps 
sent back again, etc,—until a selection capable of stabilisation has been found.126 In 
short, the point is to refer the conflict back to the systems involved—with, of course, an 
indication of the solution to be sought. 
In the 109 Ib 146 case, the problem was essentially that the legitimation for the 
market regime produced ought to have been brought about by politics and the law 
through the structural coupling of the contract. The specific shape of the CDB at the locus 
of the structural coupling of the contract suffered from the fact that no contractual partner 
adequately legitimated by political mechanisms was included in the network, so that the 
two systems of the economy and politics were brought together in a structurally 
unsatisfactory fashion. Accordingly, the network nodes ought to have been forced into 
contracting with the third parties concerned, until the network had linked its market 
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regime with a sufficiently legitimated political body or established some other adequate 
source of legitimation, which would subsequently have led to a situation-specific re-entry 
of the political legitimation demands into the CDB‘s economic rationality and thus to a 
step in the direction of a punctuated equilibrium. This is because normative protection of 
the structural coupling of the economy and (legislative) politics also guarantees the 
possibility of co-evolution of the systems, allowing both of them to irritate each other 
with their respective demands. In the case of decision 109 Ib 146, the banks involved in 
the network would then have been obliged to treat the members of the Treuhänder-
Verband on an equal footing with the privileged lawyers and members of the Chamber of 
Trustees and Auditors (‗Treuhand- und Revisionskammer‘) in relation to the disclosure 
duty.
127
 Thus, a simple ‗not that way‘ and relatively vague demands on the legal doctrine 
in the light of the above-stated normative demand ought to initiate a process whereby—
utilising evolutionary structures in a procedural way—empirically underpinned solutions 
are sought. These solutions need to obey the strict normative requirements of the law, 
and, at the same time, have to respect and follow the selfsame rationalities that brought 
the conflict before the law. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that, through this procedural approach, the 
various systems involved in the conflict are squared off with each other, along with the 
law, in evolutionary fashion at the locus of structural couplings, and, thus, a co-evolution 
of the systems is ensured, which reciprocally promotes the differentiation of the 
conflicting systems—in a direction towards constitutionalising the respective systems in 
relation to the systems in their environment, making them [p. 289] compatible.
128
 This 
procedural extension of law, set in motion by court decisions, is appropriate to new types 
of problems that arise in today‘s polycontextural society; it finds its normativity in formal 
respects by utilising the structural couplings of law and other social systems, and it 
moves in strikingly parallel fashion to the law‘s stated function of protecting the 
morphogenic structures between the systems involved, so that the systems, in our case, 
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politics and the economy, can observe each other and guarantee each other in their 
differentiation. Or, to put it another way, the substantive normative demand for protection 
for morphogenic structures and structural couplings between the conflicting social sub-
systems, in order to guarantee the capacity for evolution (or as Wiethölter puts it: 
developmental dynamics), can be secured in the form of the procedural and evolutionary 
method of adjudication described, at the sites of the structural couplings between the law 
and the various social sub-systems.
129
 In this sense, the law—as called for by democratic 
legitimation theories—both involves the society of law in finding the law, and protects 
the differentiated society—as with rule-of-law legitimation theories—while at the same 
time preserving the central rule-of-law function of the courts. 
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